In 'The Normal Rewards of Success' Jamie Whyte offered an extremely original disjunctive account of the fulfilment conditions of desires. He suggested that, for a number of desires ('basic' desires), fulfilment conditions can be captured in terms of desire extinction and behavioural reinforcement conditions. For those desires whose fulfilment conditions resist this kind of analysis ('non-basic' desires), he proposed a second strategy: fulfilment conditions are analysed in terms of the truth conditions of various beliefs, which themselves are analysed in terms of the fulfilment conditions of various basic desires. In what follows, I point out a simple problem with Whyte's strategy for assigning content to 'non-basic' desires.
According to Whyte, we can apply, for a number of desires, what one might call a 'reinforcement / extinction' theory of desire contents. This theory draws on two widely observed features of the psychology of desire: (1) the occurrence of a desire D's fulfilment condition typically leads to its extinction and (2) the satisfaction of a desire D by means of an action A commonly reinforces a disposition to subsequently carry out A upon holding D. Although no formal version of his account is presented, it would appear that the idea is somewhat like the following:
Des 1 G is the satisfaction condition of desire D iff (i) there is an action A such that D causes A, A causes G and G causes ~D, and (ii) the occurrence of ~D raises the probability D's causing A in the future.
The idea is straightforward. According to Des 1 , when I want chocolate, it is chocolate that I want and not anything else because when, for instance, upon desiring chocolate, I go to the fridge and obtain some chocolate, it is my getting chocolate (and not anything else) that both (a) quenches my desire for chocolate and (b) will thereby make me more likely to go to the fridge next time I am in that state.
1
Whatever the flaws and merits of this approach, one thing is certain: as Whyte himself points out, there are a number of desires whose fulfilment conditions cannot possibly be given by Des 1 . These include notably one's desire to be cremated or again one's desire for the prosperity of one's distant descendants, whose satisfaction in incompatible with the very existence of the desirer.
2 In order to deal with these recalcitrant desires, Whyte introduces a second contentdetermining principle:
Des 2 'A desire's fulfilment condition is that condition which is guaranteed to result from any action caused by that desire, if the beliefs with which it combines to cause the action are true.'
1 Des 1 can be seen as an attempt to improve on theories that merely appeal to the notion of desire extinction, such as the one once offered by Russell 1921. These theories notably face the problem of accounting for the content of those desires that are extinguished by states of affairs, which intuitively should not figure in their fulfilment conditions. Indeed, a desire for food can be extinguished by a glass of sour milk as can a burning ambition by a lifetime of failure. However, if a desire for food might well be extinguished by a pint of sour milk, it will not be so in such a way as to encourage one to repeat the experience next time one is hungry. Dretske 1988 offers an account similar to Des 1 .
Des 2 makes desire fulfilment conditions hinge on belief truth conditions. Now belief truth conditions are given, according to Whyte, by the following principle:
Bel A belief B's truth condition is the possible state of affairs which would be sufficient for the fulfilment of any desire D by the action A which B and D would combine to cause (Whyte 1990) .
According to Whyte then, for those desires whose fulfilment conditions are not given by Des 1 , content-assignment is a three-stage process: (i) Des 1 gives us the content for a certain number of desires, (ii) from the content of these desires, by applying Bel, we can obtain the truth conditions for a certain number of beliefs, (iii) from there, by applying Des 2 , we obtain the fulfilment conditions of the remaining desires: 
